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Historical Background and
Implications of the Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination
By Roy MoRELAND *

SOONER OR LATER one who writes upon criminal procedure must
face the issue of self-incrimination. Continually-and especially
currently-those arise who would urge that in the interest of convicting the guilty the constitutional guaranties should be relaxed,
restricted, or even disregarded. So, especially, as to the privilege
against self-incrimination.
The problem is not an easy one. If this were not already apparent, the use of the Fifth Amendment by those anxious to
escape the probings of Congressional committees as to their affiliations with Communism would show it to be. This country has
prided itself on the fact that it has an accusatorial as against an
inquisitorial form of criminal procedure. And this has been much
more than a glib statement of policy. Vigorous efforts have been
made to implement and make effective that policy. But recent
extensive practices of the police in subjecting suspected persons
to protracted "questioning," the supposed perilous need to question certain individuals as to their connections with Communism,
and the general demand to present a more vigorous front to the
wide-spread increase of crime generally have led to tremendous
pressures on this cornerstone of our civil liberties.
A study of the privilege against self-incrimination, as with
other issues involving the law, should begin with a history of the
privilege. History is not always helpful, but it often is. In any
event it increases one's understanding of the problem, its back* This is part of a chapter of a forthcoming book on Criminal Procedure.
00 Professor of Law, College of Law, University of Kentucky.
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ground and its development. In addition, there may be lessons to
be learned from the past; it is unpardonable to repeat errors. And
yet, that is a common habit of mankind.
One who attempts to trace the history of the privilege against
self-incrimination must keep in mind that there were two distinct,
although somewhat parallel, lines of development of the doctrine.
The first was the development of the opposition to the ex officio
oath of the ecclesiastical courts; the second, the history of the
opposition to the incriminating question in the common law
courts. As Wigmore points out,' these were largely, at least in
the beginning, independent developments; the first, beginning in
the 1200s and lasting well into the 1600s; the second, beginning
in the early 1600s and running on for another century.
Prior to William the Conqueror, the bishops sat as judges and
heard suits in the non-ecclesiastical courts. But William changed
this; he required the bishops to apply ecclesiastical law in cases
which they heard; the result was a double judicial system, ecclesiastical and non-ecclesiastical. This led to a battle as to the
jurisdictional limits of the two systems. Finally, in the early 1300s,
the statute, 'De Articulis Cleft' settled the line of ecclesiastical
jurisdiction over laymen by confining it to matrimonial and testimentary causes and this, in the large, prevailed until the end of
church courts in England.2
Turning now to the actual development of the procedural
device of self-incrimination, it should be pointed out that in the
1200s there was no hostile feeling or objection to the procedure of
putting a man to his oath to declare his guilt or innocence. Indeed, this sort of procedure, trial by compurgation, was standard
in both the church and popular courts and long had been. It was
common not only for the accused to declare his innocence on oath
and to call on God to witness it but to supply friends (oathhelpers) who would also proclaim his innocence on oath. Such a
proceeding was a direct appeal to the divine and resulted in a
positive decision of guilt or innocence through the party's own
act-his own affirmative appeal to deity.
But the trial by compurgation was becoming little more than
a "farce"'3 in the 1200s. The church looked around for a more
18 WIGmOrx, EVIDENCE, sec.3 2250, p. 277 (3rd ed., 1940).

Id. at 279.

Id. at 281.
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"modem" and practical procedure. So was introduced in the
church courts in the early 1200s an innovation that did eventually
occasion hostility,-the inquisitional or interrogatory oath. This
new oath pledged the accused to answer truly and then was followed by a series of questions which probed his knowledge of the
matter in issue, much after the modem manner. So, whereas the
former oath had operated simply as a declaration of innocence
buttressed upon an appeal to the Almighty, the latter furnished an
opportunity to the judge to explore and probe the mind of the
accused to discover what he might know. Then from the answers
of the accused to the several questions put to him the judge would
make his own deduction as to guilt or innocence. As Wigmore
says, "this was an epochal difference of method."4

The function of the ecclesiastical courts, naturally, was to
punish offenses against religion and morals. In a word, to punish
sin. Their use of the ex officio oath, the common name for the
procedure outlined above, is best known for the role it played in

heresy trials. In the beginning the probing and questioning under
the new oath was limited to a specific charge against the accused.

However, gradually in the head-long pursuit of heretics, a general
probing was permitted without a specific charge or presentment,
an exploratory procedure. This led to great unpopularity as to the
oath ex officio and it came to be hotly debated whether it was not
wholly unlawful. Finally, the resistance provoked by the intense
unpopularity of the procedure brought the whole system to the
ground. "The Ecclesiastical Courts were totally abolished in 1640
and though they were revived in 1661, their procedure was so
much altered, especially by the abolition of the ex officio oath,
that they have fallen into almost entire disuse for all practical
purposes, except the discipline of the clergy."5
On the non-ecclesiastical or popular court side, a similar development was going on. The Court of Star Chamber followed
ecclestiastical rules of procedure, so it employed the ex officio
oath. Coke, himself an opponent of the ex officio oath procedure,
at least on the ecclesiastical side,' participated in its use and in
the application of torture in its administration. Wigmore cites
'Idem.

2 STEPHEN, ISTORY OF THE CRanmNAL LAw OF ENGLAND 220
"Griswold, The Fifth Amendment Today, 2 (1955).

(1883).
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three specific cases where he was a consenting party in the Star
Chamber in the early 1600s.1 Indeed Dean Griswold points out
that it was apparently standard practice not only to make suspected persons give evidence against themselves but to use
torture to make them speakY So comes to the surface the inevitable concomitant of the use of self-incrimination-torture in
one form or another.
The tension and opposition in the popular courts mounted.
Finally, it came to a head in the trial of "Freeborn John" Lilburne, 10 the man to whom we primarily owe the privilege against
self-incrimination today. John was an obstreperous individual,
one who would fight for what he considered to be his rights-the
sort of person to whom society owes most of its basic liberties.
Lilburne was haled into the Court of Star Chamber in 1637 on
the charge of having imported certain heretical and seditious
books. He specifically denied these charges when questioned
while under arrest, but he was "further asked as to other like
charges." The further questions he refused to answer, saying
that since the specific charges against him could not be proved,
this was but an attempt to get other possible instances of guilt
out of his oral examination and so secure a conviction. "But," it
was suggested to him, "everyone takes the oath and it will be
wiser for you to do what other do." He still refused. Later, when
examined before the Star Chamber itself, he again refused to
answer further than as to the offenses with which he had been
specifically charged. So, the Council of the Star Chamber condemned him to be whipped and pilloried for his "boldness in
refusing to take a legal oath," without which many offenses might
go "undiscovered and unpunished."12 In April, 1638, the sentence
was carried out.
But Lilburne did not give up. He filed a petition with Parliament and on May 4, 1641, the House of Commons voted that the
sentence was "illegal and against the liberty of the subject" and
ordered reparation. Later, the House of Lords concurred, order88

WIGMOBE, EVIDENCE sec.

2250, 290, fn. 64 (3rd ed. 1940).

A mNDirr TODAY, 2 (19555; Ploscowe, THE DEAmmwi.
PRocmuns iN ETunoPE AND AmRCA,
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'Griswold, THE FirH

433, 458 (1935).
3 Lilburn's Trial, 3 How. St. Tr. 1315 (1637-1645).
"8 WiGMORE, EVIDENCE, sec. 2250, 291 (3rd. ed. 1940).
Idem.
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ing that the sentence be wholly vacated "as illegal, and most unjust, against the liberty of the subject and the law of the land and
Magna Charta."" Further, the House granted him £8000 in
reparation, a very large amount in those days.
This case was enough, practically of itself, to focus the attention of the whole of England upon the evils of the ex officio
oath. The Court of Star Chamber was abolished in 1641 and Lilburne's battle bore enduring fruit in the incorporation of the
fundamental principle for which he strove in the common law.
It should be pointed out, however, that Lilburne at no time objected to questions concerning the specific charges against him,
only as to questions involving matters for which there was no
presentment. Those who were prosecuted under the oath ex
officio up to and including Lilbume were accustomed to questioning. It was questioning which went beyond the offenses
specifically charged that raised their particular ire.
It is hard to say what this proves. History is not clear on the
point. There are those who argue that it proves that a society does
not object to inquisitorial procedure as such-only to its abuse.
However, it is the writer's opinion that while the radical change
from the compurgation oath to ex officio procedure created no
outward hostility at first, opposition in the English breast was
present from the beginning, gradually mounting, particularly with
the extension of the application of the procedure to matters not
within the presentment, until, at last, the growing resentment
finally exploded in the trial of Lilburne and the resulting notoriety
connected therewith.
Those who would urge that history does not show any resentment to the use of questioning as such, so long as it is limited to
matters relating to a specific charge, far overshoot the mark, in the
opinion of this writer. 14 This is indicated, it is submitted, by the
fact that with the explosion in the Lilburne case and the resulting
repudiation of the ex officio oath the principle which became in" 8 WiOmoRE, EvmENCE, see. 2250, p. 291 (3rd. ed. 1940).
However, it should be pointed out that nothing concerning the privilege is
mentioned in the Magna Charta. Pittman, The Colonial And Constitutional History
Of The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination In America, 21 VA. L. REV. 763, 764

(1935).
" And see Pittman, The Colonial and Constitutional History Of The Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination In America, 21 VA. L. REv. 763, 769 et seq. (1935).
The article is illuminating.
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corporated in the common law was much broader than that for
which Lilburne had contended. It went the whole way. The inquisitorial procedure was totally repudiated and it has remained
outlawed in the English and American systems to this day. But
not so on the continent. There the reader of history may see the
workings of the inquisitorial system in the history of France and
in the unspeakable horrors behind the judicial scene in Germany
and Russia under Hitler and Stalin. And so, the great contrast between the two diametrically opposed procedures, one accusatorial
and the other inquisitorial!
But the repudiation of the ex officio oath did not occur overnight in the English common law courts. After Parliament had
abolished it in the eccesiastical courts and the Court of Star
Chamber had been put out of existence, an increasing general
reaction arose to the use of inquisitorial procedure in any court.
After all, the celebrated Lilburne case had become common knowledge. The common law courts began to concede this public distaste. The oath continued to be used intermittently, however,
and was not finally discontinued completely until after the Revolution of 1688.1' By that time the privilege against self-incrimination had become so well established as a part of the common law
that it was not thought necessary to incorporate it in the English
Bill of Bights of 1689.16
Thus, it may be stated broadly that the privilege against selfincrimination having become embodied in the English common
law came to this country as a part of the legal heritage of our
early settlers.' 7 That is fundamentally true. The settlement of
the American colonies took place about the time that opposition
to the inquisitorial procedure as practiced in the ecclesiastical
courts and in Star Chamber was becoming pronounced in England. And co-incidental with the settling of the American colonies
the privilege was developing as a part of English common law.
The abolition of the ex officio oath in the ecclesiastical courts and
the abolishment of the Court of Star Chamber occurred long before the separation of the colonies from the Mother Country and
1 STEPiEN, HISTORY OF THE CIMtnNAL LAW OF ENGLAND 440 (1883).
"Pittman, The Colonial and Constitutional History of the Privilege Agaiast
(1935).
Self-Incrimination In America, 21 VA. L. REv. 763,4 774
17GIuSWOLD, THE FiFr AmENDUENT TODAY (1955).
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the Revolution. Also, long before that time the privilege had
become an accepted part of the common law of England.
But, aside from all this, the colonies had their own troubles
with inquisitorial procedures in addition to bringing here a remembrance of suffering from such practices in England. So, a
large part of the American Constitutional privilege against selfincrimination is thoroughly American in origin. It must be kept
in mind that while colonization was going on in America the old
procedures still existed, or were remembered. Indeed, there are
instances of the use of the compurgation oath in this country!s
There are, of course, numerous instances of the use of inquisitorial
procedure in America, so the colonies had their own experiences
with high-handed prerogative courts. 19 One could cite the notorious Salem witch-trials-which were not trials in fact 2°-where
questioning and even torture were accepted procedure in support
of this statement, but there are more normal and regular instances.
The story of the growing hatred of the practice of questioning
those suspected of crime and the gradual recognition of the
privilege against self-incrimination during the 1600-1700s have
been recounted by R. Carlton Pittman in his valuable historical
article in the Virginia Law Review. 2' It is his conclusion that the
Puritan mind placed the ecclesiastically created ex officio procedure in the same category of "tortures" as the rack, the boot
and the thumbscrew.22 An illustration of the temper of the time
is found in the trials in 1687 of Anne Hutchinson and John Wheelwright. A contemporaneous account of Wheelwright's Trial contains this passage: "He demanded whether he were sent for as an
innocent person, or as guilty? It was answered neither, but as
suspected onely; Then he demanded, who were his accusers? It
was answered, his Sermon; (which was there in Court) being
acknowledged by himselfe they might thereupon proceed, ex officio: at this word great exception was taken, as if the Court intended the course of the High Commission. ' 2a The High Coin",Pittman, The Colonial And Constitutional History Of The Privilege Against
Self-IncriminationIn America, 21 VA. L. REv. 763, 776, fn. 57 (1935).
INBAU, SELF-INcIMUNATION-What Can An Accused Person Be Compelled
To Do? 5 (1950).
" Pittman, The Colonial And Constitutional History Of The Privilege Against
Self-Incrimination In America, 21 VA. L. REiv. 763, 782 (1935).
'y

The article is cited in note 20, supra.

2Id. at 779.

-1 As quoted, GRISWOLD, TnE FiFT AmENDMENT TODAY, 4 (1955).
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mission was, of course, the court which was to be abolished four
years later (1641) in England, largely for its use of the ex officio
oath.
It may be concluded, then, that the American people have, as
a part of their heritage from the common law, a recognition of
the fundamental principle that no man should be forced by question and answer to convict himself out of his own mouth. The
recognition of that principle is the result of historical experience
in England. But also, that principle, as we know it in America
today, is buttressed upon our own unhappy experience in the
early years of the Colonies. Self-incrimination was tried in this
country and found wanting. Their personal knowledge and fear
of the practice were the primary motivations behind the insistence
of our forebears that the privilege against self-incrimination be
incorporated in the federal and state constitutions.
Before concluding, re-iteration should be made of the historical fact that experience has shown that torture is always an
inevitable concomitant of self-incrimination. There are those who
suggest that the principle of self-incrimination could be re-introduced into the English system of law without torture. We are
civilized today! Decent people do not inflict torture! What rubbish. One has only to review the very recent exhibitions of cruelty
and sadistic brutality in World War II and in Korea to know that
people have not changed in their willingness to use torture. Indeed, they have developed new, exquisite methods of torturesuch as Chinese and Russian brain washing!
There are also those who urge that it is only on the Continent
that self-incrimination and torture have been linked. That torture
is alien to the English and American nature. History does not support such a statement. Griswold, in discussing the period in England around the latter part of the 16th Century says, "Over the
next fifty years (following 1589), it was apparently standard
practice not only to make suspected persons give evidence against
themselves, but also to use torture to make sure that the accused
would speak."23 Again, later in his discussion, he states, ". . . the
establishment of the privilege (against self-incrimination) is
closely linked historically with the abolition of torture."24 And,
GRISWOLD,

2,Id. at 7.
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Morris Plescowe quotes as follows from a book of the time:
'The racke is us'd no where as in England. In other Countries tis us'd in Judicature, when there is a semi-plena-probatio, a halfe proofe against a man, then to see if they can
make it full, they racke him to try if hee will Confess. But
here in England, they take a man & racke him, I doe not
know why, nor when, not in time of Judicature, but when
some body bidds.' Table Talk of John Seldon (Pollock ed.
1927) 133.25
Let us consider another phase of the relation between the
infliction of torture and the privilege against self-incrimination.
There are those who would use the inquisitorial procedure if it
were limited in its exercise to open court. The specific suggestion
usually made is that a magistrate be permitted to question one
accused of a crime at the preliminary examination. Those who
advocate this procedure are of the opinion that it would engender
no danger of torture since the proceeding would be public.
Further, they are careful to distinguish confessions secured from
those in confinement from the exercise of the privilege against
self-incrimination, which is strictly a rule of procedure having to
do with the trial of the case. Admitting the danger of torture
from secret questioning while the suspected person is in confinement, they argue that no such danger would arise from an inquisition in public.
It is true that the privilege against self-incrimination and the
rule having to do with voluntary confessions represent separate
and distinct-although over-lapping-principles, as pointed out by
Wigmore.26 They had a separate development. And, admittedly,
the danger of torture to one who is in confinement and whose
confession is being sought in secret is greater than in the case of
an inquisition held in public at an examining trial. But a potential
danger exists in the latter situation also. Torture does not have to
be inflicted in public to be effective. The questionee can be
"softened up" in private for his public appearance. The Russians
have shown how effective this sort of thing can be. Men in public
-without the slightest indication of torture-with the questioner
Ploscowe, The Development of Present-Day Criminal Procedures In Europe
And America, 48 HAnv. L. Rv. 433, 458, note 68 (1935).
8 VIGion, EVmENCE, sec. 2266 (3rd. ed. 1940).
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speaking. quietly and in a low-almost sweet-voice, admit all
sorts of crimes. But the scene was set beforehandl What has happened in Russia is but a repetition of historical examples to be
found in England, France, or in the early colonies in the United
States, where inquisitorial procedure has been used.

